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AN EXAMINATION OF COURT OPINIONS ON THE
ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE OF CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS AND OTHER CONSERVATION AND





This article surveys conservation easement enforcement and defense
decisions to date, and examines those decisions under the rubric of sev-
eral general themes. The article focuses on themes influencing or driving
the opinions of courts in conservation easement enforcement and defense
actions across jurisdictional lines. These themes include issues of stand-
ing, ambiguity and the role of intent in judicial decision-making on is-
sues of conservation easement enforcement and defense, judicial atti-
tudes towards restrictive servitudes, the role of common law rules of real
property and contract construction and interpretation, and cost-benefit
analyses.
Part I of this article provides an overview and survey of the cases
reviewed. Part II examines the issue of standing and participation. Part
III looks at the roles of intent, common law rules of real property and
contract construction, the merger doctrine, and cost-benefit analyses in a
series of defense and enforcement opinions. Part III also includes an
analysis of a unique line of case involving the Foundation for Preserva-
tion of Historic Georgetown. In conclusion, we advise land trusts to an-
ticipate confronting most or all of the issues raised to date in cases in-
volving conservation easement enforcement and defense.
I. OVERVIEW AND SURVEY OF ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE CASES TO
DATE
For purposes of this article, we examine nineteen published opin-
ions, the group of which resulted from an exhaustive search for enforce-
ment and defense cases in jurisdictions throughout the United States.'
I. Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446 (2nd Cir. 1985); Nebraska v.
Rural Electrification Admin., 23 F.3d 1336 (8th Cir. 1994); Racine v. United States, 858 F.2d 506
(9th Cir. 1988); Madden v. The Nature Conservancy, 823 F. Supp. 815 (D. Mont. 1992); Gallaway
v. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc., No. 94-36-M-CCL, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636 (D. Mont. April 22,
1996); Gallaway v. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc., No. 94-36-M-CCL, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645 (D.
Mont. March 25, 1997); Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 585 F. Supp. 195 (N.D.N.Y.
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Our analysis also includes a minimum number of unpublished decisions,
or cases subject to appellate review. The majority of cases surveyed here
occurred in the East: New York (two), New Jersey (one), the District of
Columbia (four), Massachusetts (three), Connecticut (three), New Hamp-
shire (one), Vermont (one), and Pennsylvania (one).2 This finding is
logical because landowners and land trusts in the East have been using
conservation easements for a longer period of time than any other part of
the country. 3 Of the cases brought in the Midwest/West, three examined
take place in federal court.4 Only two of the Eastern cases analyzed oc-
curred in federal court,5 and Natale was brought only after after the land-
owners lost soundly in state court in Pennsylvania after a decade of pro-
ceedings.6 In Madden and Gallaway, Montana state law applied to the
claims at issue, and while the Natale case ostensibly posed some federal
questions, the court rejected those claims.7
Landowners trying to invalidate the deed restrictions or servitudes
on their property initiated three of the cases reviewed; we refer to these
as defense cases because the grantee of the deed restriction is defending
1984); Natale v. Schwartz, No. 98-3298, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18933 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 1999);
Sagalyn v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Bagley v.
Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Found. for the Pres. of
Historic Georgetown v. Arnold, 651 A.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Acheson v. Sheaffer, 520 A.2d 318
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Southbury Land Trust, Inc. v. Andricovich, 757 A.2d 1263 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000);
Burgess v. Breakell, No. 95-0068033, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290 (Conn. Aug. 7, 1995); Harris
v. Pease, 66 A.2d 590 (Conn. 1949); Goldmuntz v. Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864 (Mass. App. Ct.
1995); Knowles v. Codex Corp., 426 N.E.2d 734 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981); Bennett v. Comm'r of Food
and Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1991); New Hampshire v. Rattee, 761 A.2d 1076 (N.H. 2000);
Redwood Constr. Corp. v. Doombosch, 670 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Redwood Constr.
Corp. v. Doornbosch, 655 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v.
Knowlton, 64 N.Y.2d 387 (N.Y. 1985); Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Knowlton, 475
N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Smith v. United States, 979 F. Supp. 279 (D. VT 1997).
2. Id.
3. See Julie Ann Gustanski, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements, Voluntary
Actions, and Private Lands, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE 9, 17-21 (Julie Ann Gustanski and Roderick H. Squires, eds., 2000) [hereinafter,
PROTECTING THE LAND].
4. Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815; Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645; Clark, 754 F.2d
446.
5. Natale, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18933, Smith, 979 F. Supp. 279.
6. Natale is a famous case involving the French & Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust. At
the state level, the Trust succeeded in obtaining court orders for the demolition of a house that
violated the conservation easement at issue in the case. The landowners refused to remove the house
so the Trust made the necessary arrangements and bulldozed the residence. Thereafter, the
lanowners filed a number of scattershot constitutional and state law claims in federal court. The
state court decisions preceding Natale are not published and the authors could not obtain the ten
years of court documents in time to include an analysis of the case in this paper.
7. See Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815; Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645; Natale, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18933.
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that tool against attack and attempting to uphold its validity. Two of the
three landowners failed to invalidate the deed restriction; one succeeded.8
With the exception of two, in all of the cases examined, second (or
later) generation landowners owning property already encumbered by
some form of deed restriction or conservation easement initiated or de-
fended the actions. 9 In Burgess, a neighbor brought a claim against an-
other landowner for failing to adhere to the terms of a conservation
easement on the landowner's property; the court found the neighbor
lacked standing.' 0 In Acheson, residents and voters of a town attempted
to sue a developer for executing a development plan different from the
one they voted to approve, but the court ruled that they too lacked
standing to bring the action."
In the enforcement cases, or those in which land trusts or the crea-
tors of conservation easements, restrictive covenants, or deed restrictions
filed actions against landowners to force them to comply with the terms
of restrictions encumbering their property, the violations at issue include
construction of new dwellings on property (four),' 2 adding to existing
dwelling on property (four) 13, subdividing property (two) 14 , logging on
property (two)15, changing density or proposing development on property
(two) 16, creating a right-of-way across property (one) 17 , and building a
pool.' 8 In one case from the West, a landowner brought suit to determine
whether the "scenic easement" on his property precluded construction of
dude ranching facilities.' 9
It is important to note that not all of the cases involve conservation
easements per se. Some involve deed restrictions (Madden, Gallaway,
Harris),20 others agricultural restrictions or easements created by statute
(Rattee, Bennett), ' and still others involve preservation servitudes
8. Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815; Harris, 66 A.2d 590, Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16645.
9. Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290; Acheson, 520 A.2d 318.
10. Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290.
11. Acheson, 520 A.2d 318.
12. Natale, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18933; Southbury Land Trust, Inc., 757 A.2d 1263;
Bennett, 576 N.E.2d 1365; Rattee, 761 A.2d 1076.
13. Sagalyn, 691 A.2d 107; Arnold, 651 A.2d 794; Bagley, 647 A.2d 1110; Acheson, 520
A.2d 318.
14. Sagalyn, 691 A.2d 107; Acheson, 520 A.2d 318.
15. Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super, LEXIS 2290; Knowles, 426 N.E.2d 734.
16. Harris, 66 A.2d 590; Friends, 754 F.2d 446.
17. Redwood Constr. Corp., 670 N.Y.S.2d 560.
18. Goldmuntz, 651 N.E.2d 864.
19. Racine, 858 F.2d at 506.
20. Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815, Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645; Harris, 66 A.2d
590.
21. Rattee, 761 A.2d 1076; Bennett, 576 N.E.2d 1365.
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(Acheson, Bagley, Arnold, Sagalyn).22 The balance of the cases involve
conservation easements (Southbury, Redwood, Clark, Goldmuntz),23 but
all concern a conservation or preservation instrument of some type.
II. STANDING AND PARTICIPATION IN DEFENSE AND ENFORCEMENT
CASES
A. Third Party Standing
When evaluating the issues of conservation and historic preservation
easements, courts have addressed in litigation the question of who can
24participate in such actions repeatedly. In at least one case, the court
examines in detail whether a neighbor had standing to argue that the
landowner of property next door to him violated the terms of the ease-
25ment to which the landowner/grantor was subject. In another case, the
court determines that residents and voters harmed by misrepresentations
concerning the conservation easement agreed to by a developer lacked
standing to challenge alleged violations of the easement.
In Burgess v. Breakell, a third-party neighbor brought an action to
enforce a conservation restriction. Burgess alleged that Breakell was
violating the terms of the conservation restriction at issue by engaging in
27commercial logging on the property. The conservation restriction on
Breakell's land required the property to be maintained as an area of
"wild, natural, and semi-natural open space for scientific, educational,
scenic, environmental, aesthetic and cultural purposes, for the preserva-
tion of its natural features.,, 28 Breakell argued the court should dismiss
Burgess's complaint for lack of standing because the Connecticut Con-
servation Commission, and not Burgess, held the restriction at issue on
29his property.
The court agreed with Breakell, finding that Burgess did not have
standing to bring the action, and pointed to Connecticut's conservation
22. Acheson, 520 A.2d 318; Bagley, 647 A.2d 1110; Arnold, 651 A.2d 794; Sagalyn, 691
A.2d 107.
23. Southbury, 757 A.2d 1263; Redwood, 670 N.Y.S.2d 560; Clark, 754 F.2d 446;
Goldmuntz, 651 N.E.2d 864.
24. For example, in Redwood Construction v. Doornbosch, the court recognized the standing
rights of a contract-vendee to challenge a conservation restriction. Redwood Constr. Corp. v.
Doombosch, 248 A.D.2d 698 (1998). Doornbosch involved the holder of a conservation easement
across property with an easement of fight of way, which Redwood Construction sought to purchase
and utilize. See id. The court recognized that Redwood, as the contract-vendee, had standing to
challenge the construction and application of the conservation easement to the easement right-of-
way. See id.
25. Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super LEXIS 2290.
26. See id. at * 1.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at *2-*3.
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restriction statutes. 30 The court expressly acknowledged that "the ques-
tion of who may enforce a conservation restriction is not clearly resolved
by statutory language., 31 Thus, the court could have reached a much dif-
ferent conclusion on the issue of standing in Burgess. The court stated
that while the Connecticut legislature chose to abrogate certain common
law doctrines governing conservation restrictions, it did not specifically
abrogate an ownership requirement for standing in an easement dispute.
The language of the statutes, asserted the court, shows that the legisla-
ture, "while recognizing the public benefit that such [conservation] re-
strictions provide, intended to limit the enforceability of conservation
restrictions to the holder or owner of the restriction. 33 The court relied
on statements b' the Massachusetts Supreme Court to interpret Con-
necticut statutes.
In the face of unclear statutory language, the court could have looked
to federal environmental laws and cases for guidance on the issue of
standing, rather than the laws of Massachusetts. For example, the same
principles expressed in Sierra Club v. Morton and Sierra Club v. SCRAP,
wherein third-party citizens with an interest that could be harmed or im-
paired by the outcomes in the cases were granted standing, could have
provided the Connecticut court with an alternative approach to the
standing question in Burgess, an approach more consistent with the ex-
press purposes of the conservation restrictions at issue under Connecti-
cut's General Statutes.35 There is little doubt that adjacent landowners
like Burgess were harmed by Breakell's commercial logging venture;
their property values were adversely affected by the activity. Further, the
logging operation likely impaired the conservation restriction's public
benefit, which was reflected in the "scenic, environmental, aesthetic and
cultural" values served by the restriction.36
One published decision, at the time of writing this article, cites
Morton to confirm standing in a suit by a third party in interest. In
Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, discussed at length below in
section Ill(B), the United States District Court for the Northern District
of New York relied upon allegations in the Friends of the Shawangunks'
complaint concerning its mission statement and the adverse effects of the
proposed development at issue to conclude that the organization did have
standing to bring the action. 3 Friends of the Shawangunks asserted that
30. See id. at *6-*7.
31. Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290 at *5.
32. See id. at *7.
33. Id. at *7.
34. See id. at *6.
35. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
36. Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290, at *1.
37. 585 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
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it had been formed "to ensure the preservation and prudent development
of the Shawangunk Mountains" and that the development slated for land
subject to a conservation easement would "adversely affect" the use and
enjoyment of the land by many members of the Friends of the Shawan-
gunks.
3 8
In contrast to Friends, in Knowles v. Codex Corp., the court essen-
tially ignored the Morton and SCRAP principles altogether. In Knowles,
the court examined whether residents and voters had standing to sue a
corporation for misrepresenting its plans for a proposed development,
which also included a conservation easement, in a brochure it distributed
to all the voters of Canton, Massachusetts prior to a town meeting on the
development. 39 After voters agreed to permit development, Codex exe-
cuted and recorded a plan different from that circulated to the townspeo-
ple.40 The court found that the residents/voters failed to state a claim
against Codex or the town's conservation commission (which was joined
as a defendant) because the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek an invali-
dation of the town vote or an injunction for compliance with the original
plan. 41 The court stated that none of the residents or voters had standing
to pursue their claims because they did not qualify as private individuals
litigating questions of public nuisance or the wrongful use of public or
42private iands under state statutes.
The court asserted that the specific statute establishing a conserva-
tion commission to manage and control the public's interests in the land
subject to conservation easements safeguarded the town's rights.43 The
court did not address individual resident's rights, but noted in cursory
fashion that the court in Morton and SCRAP relied upon "adversely af-
fected or aggrieved" language in 5 U.S.C. 702.44 The court's reference to
Morton and SCRAP is so brief that it belies the importance and relevance
of the principles in those two cases to the standing issues in cases like
Knowles. In Knowles, it is difficult to skirt the fact that the plaintiffs'
interests were adversely affected, not only by the changed development
plans, but also by the developer's conduct.4 In light of the number of
cases that we reviewed wherein courts interpret unclear state statutes
conservatively, and either ignore or avoid the standing principles set
forth in federal environmental cases, it appears state courts may fear
opening a floodgate of litigation by conferring standing on plaintiffs tra-
ditionally excluded from enforcement rights, or it may be that courts are
38. Id.
39. See Knowles, at 735-37.
40. See id. at 735-36.
41. See id. at 738.
42. See id. at 737.
43. See id. at 737-38.
44. Knowles, 426 N.E.2d at 738, n.13.
45. Id. at 735-36.
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simply reluctant to depart-from conventional common law rules holding
that only record holders of interests in land have standing to bring actions
related to those interests.
One of the noteworthy aspects of Knowles is that it appears from the
face of the court's published opinion that the defendant-developer pulled
a fast one on the community, with the tacit approval of the town's con-
servation commission. The defendant furnished a development map to
voters that was not adhered to upon commencement of the office park,
and demolished several historical farm buildings contra to representa-
tions made or implied in meetings with townspeople. The court ad-
dressed the defendant's back-handed actions in a footnote only:
An observant student of the plan might have concluded that at least
one of the existing buildings lay in the path of a proposed access road
to the 'campus.' An observant student of the formal instrument might
have concluded that nothing therein obligated Codex to maintain or
preserve any of the existing buildings.47
Apparently, the court expected the community to be an "observant
student" with regard to the precise language of the areement, notwith-
standing Codex' s representations at town meetings. One outstanding
question in the case, which cannot be determined from the court's opin-
ion, is why the conservation commission itself declined to challenge the
defendant's actions. The reason may be because the commission had
reviewed the agreement and understood its implications, contrary to the
perceptions and desires of community residents.
B. Ways that Land Trusts Participate in Civil Actions as Third Parties
Whether a neighboring landowner or town residents and voters have
standing to sue in a lawsuit is a different inquiry from whether a land
trust may participate in litigation, within the scope of its trust documents,
by intervening in a case to which it is not already a party. The court ad-
dresses the question of whether the trustees of a land trust have authority
under their Trust Declaration to engage in litigation in Nebraska v. Rural
Electrification Administration.
49
In Rural, the court debated whether to limit the participation of the
Platte River Whooping Crane Maintenance Trust in environmental liti-
gation involving the Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir in Wyoming and the
Missouri Basin Power Project.50 The Trust was established as part of a
settlement agreement reached in prior litigation that gave one of the par-
46. Id. at 736.
47. Id. at 736, n.8.
48. Id.
49. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 23 F.3d 1336 (8th Cir. 1994).
50. See id. at 1338.
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ties in the action an exemption to the Endangered Species Act and per-
mitted construction of the dam and reservoir at issue in Rural.5 In its
review of whether the Trust could participate in relicensing proceedings
for Grayrock, and more broadly in proceedings related to other dams and
legal cases, the court examined the purposes set forth in the Trust Decla-
ration. That document stated as the Trust's purpose: "to finance pro-
grams, activities, and acquisitions to protect and maintain the migratory
bird habitat in the so-called Big Bend area of the Platte River between
Overton and Chapman, Nebraska., 53 As noted by the court, the Trust
Declaration also stated that:
programs, activities, and acquisitions . shall be formulated to pro-
tect and maintain, consistent with the provisions hereof, the physical,
hydrological, and biological integrity of the Big Bend area so that it
may continue to function as a life-support system for the whooping
crane and other migratory species which utilize it.
54
The court found that the Trust Declaration did not conflict with the
specific directives, also contained in the Declaration, against participa-
tion by the Trust in influencing legislation, political campaigns, or any
litigation other than litigation directly related to the administration of the
Trust.y
5
The court's reliance on, and deference to, the Trust Declaration un-
derscores the importance of clear, well-defined purpose statements for
land trusts. The Rural court concluded that participation in litigation by
the Trust that bore directly on the supply of water flowing to critical
crane habitat was within the powers, duties, and administration of the
Trust.56 The court read the Trust Declaration as clearly authorizing the
Trustees "to counteract through litigation the depletion and degradation
of the critical habitat" of the endangered whooping crane.57
When land trusts seek to participate in lawsuits, the trust's purpose
or declaration may become an issue, as in Rural, along with rules of
standing. In Smith v. United States, the court rejected the Vermont Land
Trust's (VLT) bid to intervene as a matter of right or by permission in a
lawsuit concerning a taxpayer's action for a refund of the taxes that both
the taxpayer and VLT felt were unwarranted. 8 Smith disputed the tax on
his property and the resulting refund because, he argued, the IRS failed
to recognize a reduction in the value of his property that resulted from
51. See id. at 1337.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 1338.
54. Id.
55. See id at 1338, 1340.
56. See id. at 1340.
57. See id.
58. Smith v. United States, 95 CV 195, slip. op. at 3 (D. Vt. Sept. 19, 1997).
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the imposition of the conservation easement that he had donated to
VLT.59 While VLT argued that it should be permitted to participate on
Smith's behalf because of its interest in the recognition and valuation of
the conservation easement,6 ° the court allowed VLT to participate in the
action only as a friend of the court, or amicus curiae. The court found
that VLT had neglected to address the sovereign immunity of the U.S.
government and acquire the waiver necessary for intervention.
Permitting VLT to participate as an amicus curiae in the action was
the court's way of allowing VLT to voice its position on the issues, with-
out being a party. The court offered, "[I]n many cases, appearance as
amicus can be as effective as formal intervention. '62 The court made
clear that it valued the land trust's involvement by asserting, "VLT has
demonstrated to the Court both a genuine interest in the subject matter at
hand as well as expertise in the area of development rights and conserva-
tion easements. VLT will therefore be granted the opportunity to be
heard by this Court.,
63
In Smith, the court not only allowed VLT's participation, but en-
dorsed it and specifically noted the potential value of the land trust's
contribution to the case. Land trusts should be encouraged by the court's
decision in Smith. Even if a land trust cannot intervene as a party in an
action by right or by permission, it may still be able to participate in a
meaningful way as a resource for the court as an amicus curiae.
III. THE ROLE OF INTENT IN ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE CASES
Once courts resolve issues of standing and participation, they turn
next to the focal point of the dispute, often the meaning and interpreta-
tion of the documents at issue. In enforcement and defense cases con-
cerned with the validity and/or construction of particular conservation
easements or restrictions, courts have looked beyond the plain language
in the easement or restriction at issue and, when faced with what they
characterize as an ambiguity, attempted to discern the parties' intent at
the time the parties entered into the agreement. This type of analysis ap-
pears repeatedly in opinions involving conservation documents and,
when combined with other analyses such as cost-benefit evaluations and
the role of common law rules, has a marked impact on judicial decision-
making.
59. See id.
60. See id.; Motion to Intervene (Paper #6), Smith v. United States. 95 CV 195 (D. Vt. Sept.
19, 1997).
61. See Smith v. United States, 95 CV 195, slip. op. at 1,4.
62. See id. at 5.
63. See id.
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A. Defense and Validity Actions
Courts have searched for conservation easement drafters' intent in a
trio of cases in which the parties opposed to the easement challenge the
validity and enforceability of the conservation restrictions prior owners
placed on property. 64 These are cases in which a prior or current land-
owner or land trust is forced to defend the validity and enforceability of
the easement or restriction on the property while the parties opposed to
the restrictions, here all second (or later) generation landowners, hope to
do away with the restrictions altogether by arguing that the original in-
tent was not to create such a restriction in the first place.
In the first of the three, Madden v. The Nature Conservancy, the
owners of the Shining Mountain Ranch sought a declaratory judgment in
hopes of invalidating the restrictions placed on the property by The Na-
ture Conservancy. 65 After a determination that a reservation under Mon-
tana law can create conservation servitudes, the court examined the ac-
tual language of the deed transferring the property from The Nature Con-
servancy to the Maddens' predecessor to determine the intent of the par-
66ties who created the original restrictions.
The court looked to two specific clauses in the covenants and servi-
tudes incorporated into the deed from The Nature Conservancy. The first
stated: "It]he rights retained by the Grantor by the covenants are the fol-
lowing .... ,,67 and the second stated: "[a]fter title to the surface of the
land has been conveyed to a third party, then the Grantor shall retain the
same rights of enforcement, with the same privileges and discretions.,
68
The Maddens argued that conflict between the uses of the word "retain"
in the two clauses made it impossible for the second clause to have re-
served conservation rights.
Avoiding what it referred to as an "overly technical interpretation of
words" to ascertain the parties' intent, the court found that "retain"
means "reserve," and that The Nature Conservancy had reserved prop-
erty restrictions in its conveyance to the Maddens' predecessor, which
rights and reservations were still in effect when the deed was subse-
quently conveyed to the Maddens. 69 The court ruled, therefore, that The
Nature Conservancy held a valid servitude on the Shining Mountain
Ranch, which was enforceable against the Maddens.7 ° One notable aspect
64. Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815; Harris, 66 A.2d 590; Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16645.
65. Madden, 823 F. Supp. at 816.
66. See id. at 817.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 818.
70. See id. at 819.
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of Madden, which contrasts the case to others discussed infra, is that the
court specifically reviewed the entire document at issue to determine the
intent of the parties, and not just isolated phrases or sections.
In a second validity case, Gallaway,71 the parties cross-motioned for
summary judgment on the issue of whether restrictions on the subject
property were valid and enforceable. 72 Van Hook co-owned 125 acres in
Montana, which he and his co-owners sold to Gallaway and Ritter in
1975 by way of a contract that contained restrictive covenants limiting
natural resource development, specifically timber harvesting.73 Although
the contract for purchase contained express restrictions, the warranty
deed transferring the property did not.74 Hasstedt purchased the property
from Gallaway and Ritter in 1991, also by a contract containing restric-
tive language, and a deed that did not.75 Hasstedt assigned his contract
for deed to the Merritts by quitclaim deed, made subject to the express
restrictions in the contract. The Merritts sold the property to defendant
Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. ("IFI") in 1992 by a warranty deed that
stated the property was free from encumbrances except for those of rec-
ord.77 IFI admitted having knowledge of the timber harvest restrictions,
but after purchasing the land promptly notified the plaintiffs that it con-
sidered the restrictions unenforceable.
Gallaway and Van Hook argued that the restrictions were valid con-
servation servitudes reserved pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 70-17-
102(7) 79 and, as such, could be held "in gross" in order to allow the bur-
den on the property to run with the land even though the benefit did not
80touch or concern any land. IFI argued that Gallaway and Van Hook
failed to reserve such an interest in the property.8' In the alternative, IFI
asserted that any restrictions reserved by the plaintiffs were extinguished
by merger because the plaintiffs owned the land at the same time that the
restrictions were placed on it.
82
71. Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645; Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636.
72. Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645, at *2.
73. See id. at *2.





79. The court takes pains to point out, though, that Gallaway and Van Hook originally argued
that the restrictions were restrictive covenants running with the land under §§ 70-17-201, et seq., but
that the plaintiffs subsequently conceded that the restrictions, called "restrictive covenants", failed to
place a benefit on the land at issue, or any of the tract of land that touched or concerned the property,
and so only imposed a burden on the property that did not run with the land.
80. See Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645, at *3-4.
81. See id. at *4.
82. See id.
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The court concluded that the intent of the parties was to restrict log-
ging on the property only until the purchase price for the property was
paid, and not perpetually. 3 The court found support for this position by
citing the absence of restrictive language in the warranty deed (even
though such language appeared in the contract for purchase and subse-
quent buyers took notice of the restrictions), which it referred to as a key
fact in the case. 84 Because the court found that a warranty deed controls
questions about the extent and nature of parties' rights after a contract for
deed terminates, and that the warranty deeds at issue contained no limit-
ing language, the court found it to be a matter of fact that the parties did
not intend the restriction on logging to run with the land.85 The court
reached this conclusion in spite of Gallaway's and Van Hook's assertions
that it was their intention to preserve the natural integrity of the property
by limiting natural resource development, timber harvesting in particu-
lar.86 Even with the original parties to the contract explaining their intent,
the court justified a contrary finding regarding the parties' intent through
the absence of limiting language in the warranty deed.87 The court stated
further that even if the warranty deed had possessed such restricting lan-
guage, it would have found the restrictions therein to be unenforceable
by way of merger.
88
Gallaway represents an instance where the court appears to deter-
mine the proper outcome of the case, and then subsequently devises the
intent of the parties in a way that supports and justifies its findings. The
court never references the actual language in the restrictions in the con-
veyance documents. This omission, combined with specific language in
the court's opinion, disclose the possible underlying reason for the out-
come in Gallaway: loss of economic value. A "let's not lose this valu-
able timber" undercurrent in the magistrate's recommendation in the case
is overt; the presence of that concern in the district court's opinion is
more subtle.
U.S. Magistrate Judge Holter explained in a footnote:
These restrictions are, in substance, timber reservations designed to
prevent the harvesting of trees from the land in question. This court
recognizes that a contract reserving timber rights may be so made as
to ... reserve to the grantor a perpetual right to have the timber re-
main on the land .... However, because the creation of an unlimited
interest in all existing timber and all the timber to be grown in the
future severely curtails the use of the soil itself and greatly diminishes
83. See id. at * 10.
84. See id.
85. Id, at *2.
86. See Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645, at *2.
87. See id at *2-3.
88. See id. at *10.
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its value, the intention to create such an extensive timber interest
must be very clearly manifested.
89
So what Magistrate Holter appears to aver is while it is clear that Galla-
way and Van Hook intended to create timber harvesting restrictions, and
IFI purchased the land with notice of those limitations, the court will not
uphold them. The magistrate relies on the merger doctrine to justify ex-
tinguishing the conservation restriction. 90 But under the circumstances,
the merger doctrine's applicability is suspect at best. The court applies
that doctrine in spite of the fact that one of IFI's predecessors entered
into a contract to purchase the land from the plaintiffs under certain
terms and conditions, a contract that called for transfer of the deed two
years from the date of the contract subject to certain reserved rights (in-
cluding the restriction).9' One explanation for the magistrate's strained
opinion on intent and the applicability of the merger doctrine is a possi-
ble underlying proverbial thorn in his side: a cost-benefit perspective on
the perceived loss of a heavily-forested parcel.92
The district court makes reference to the heavily-forested nature of
the land at issue in Gallaway.93 The court then goes on to rely on the
warranty deeds to determine "as a matter of fact that the intention of the
parties was to restrict logging only until the purchase price was paid." 94
The court so finds in spite of express language in the original conveyance
documents that it was the express intention of the parties to protect the
land's natural character and that all vegetation on the property was to
"remain undisturbed by forces other than nature." 95 The conveyance
document also conferred standing on the plaintiffs and any of plaintiffs'
heirs or assigns to bring an action for any violation of the restrictive
96covenants. How, then, can the district court characterize the restrictive
documents as a "temporary security device?, 97 It does so based on an
underlying set of values, the first of which appears to be free and reason-
able land use, e.g. timber harvesting.
98
With respect to Madden and Gallaway, it is worthwhile to comment
on the merger doctrine to which the courts refer in those opinions. The
doctrine of merger operates in situations where a dominant estate bene-
fits from, and a servient estate is bound by, a servitude. If the owner of
the dominant estate acquires title to the servient estate, the two estates
89. Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 21636, at *20, n.8 (citations omitted).
90. See id. at * 19.
91. Seeid. at*15-16.
92. Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645, at *2.
93. Id. at *2.
94. Id. at *10.
95. Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636, at *3.
96. Id. at *2-3.
97. Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645, at * 10.
98. Id. at *11.
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merge and the servitude is extinguished.99 The merger doctrine is of par-
ticular importance when considering the law of conservation easements
because although a conservation easement may be imposed on a piece of
property "in gross," or without a dominant estate,100 some courts hold
that if the owner of an easement acquires the fee title to the eased prop-
erty, the easement is extinguished.' 0 '
In addition to a common law doctrine of merger, several states pro-
vide for the extinguishment of conservation easements by merger in their
state conservation easement statutes. 0 2 Colorado and Utah are two such
states.l°3 By contrast, Mississippi and New York specifically prohibit the
extinguishment of conservation easements by merger. 10 Land trusts and
landowners in states without statutory language either specifically per-
mitting or prohibiting termination of conservation restrictions by merger
may find themselves the vagaries of courts applying traditional common
law rules like the doctrine of merger to eradicate intended conservation
tools.10
The federal court in Montana has twice examined the validity and
enforceability of conservation restrictions in the context of Montana's
statutory merger doctrine.1 6 Montana recognizes conservation easements
in the form of conservation servitudes reserved pursuant to Mont. Code
Ann. § 70-17-102(7). °7 It also recognizes, however, the doctrine of
merger in Mont. Code. Ann. § 70-17-105, which states "[a] servitude
thereon cannot be held by the owner of the servient tenement," and §
70-17-111, which states that "[a] servitude is extinguished by the vesting
of the right to the servitude and the right to the servient tenement in the
same person."'
10 8
99. Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636, at * 15.
100. A servitude in gross allows the burden to run even if the benefit side does not touch or
concern any land.
101. Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636; Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815.
102. Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in
PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 5, at 46. For more information on merger, Mayo cites William
R. Ginsberg, The Destructibility of Conservation Easements through Merger, THE BACK FORTY,
August 1991, at 5-8, and Paul Doscher and Sylvia Bates, Merging Ownership of Conservation
Easements with Fee Interests: The Experience of the Society for the Protection of New Hampshire
Forests, THE BACK FORTY, August 1991, at 1-4. Id.
103. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-30.5-107 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 57-18-5 (2000).
104. See Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in
PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 5, at 46.
105. See id. at 47.
106. Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636; Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815.
107. The section of the code provides that "the following land burdens or servitudes upon land
may be granted and held though not attached to land ... (7) the right of conserving open space to
preserve park, recreational, historic, aesthetic, cultural and natural values on or related to land."
Mont. Code Ann. § 70-17-102(7) (2000).
108. Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636 at *15.
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In Madden, the landowner argued that The Nature Conservancy re-
served a conservation easement on the Shining Mountain Ranch before
conveying the property and, therefore, actually granted the servitude to
itself. As a result, argued Madden, the conservation easement was extin-
guished by merger.109
The court disagreed.1 ° It focused on timing and concluded that at
no time did The Nature Conservancy hold fee title and the conservation
restriction together because it "clearly" conveyed the fee to Shining
Mountain Ranch and reserved the conservation easement
simultaneously.' 11
While the court in Madden recognized a simultaneous conveyance
of restriction and fee, the court in Gallaway did not. 1 2 Although the
same court again examined the timing of the reservation of the easement
and the conveyance of fee title, in Gallaway it agreed with the
purchaser. 113
The doctrine of merger is important to note because, according to
the two federal Montana cases, if the owner of a property reserves a con-
servation easement in a deed prior to selling the property, the easement
may merge with the dominant estate." 4 Similarly, if a land trust, as the
holder of a conservation easement, acquires fee title to eased property,
that easement runs the risk of being extinguished, particularly in states
with statutes like Montana's, or in states where statutes are silent and
courts apply the common law doctrine of merger.'15
Following Madden and Galloway, Harris v. Pease, an early 1949
case, is the last in the trio of cases that we examined in which courts have
looked to the intent of the parties to determine a conservation restric-
tion's validity. 16 There, Harris filed a declaratory judgment action to
determine the validity and enforceability of a development restriction.
117
Harris' predecessor-in-interest, Doyle, had restricted development on
109. Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815.
110. Gallaway, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 21636.
111. The court states:
Clearly, if the court is to follow the dictates of the Montana Supreme Court and 'ascertain
the intent of the grantor from a consideration of the entire instrument,' it must conclude
that the reservation was made contemporaneously with the passing of title and that title to
the conservation rights and the fee estate have never been merged.
Madden, 823 F. Supp. at 816.
112. Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636.
113. See discussion supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
114. See discussion supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
115. See Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in
PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 5, at 46.
116. See Harris v. Pease, 66 A.2d 590 (Conn. 1949).
117. See Harris, 66 A.2d at 590.
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eight of the fifty-one acres that Harris purchased.'1 8 Harris acquired the
land with actual knowledge of the restriction. "9
Before Harris bought property from Doyle, Pease purchased land
from Doyle directly across from the restricted property and paid more for
it because of the restriction, which was of great value to her property.
20
The court asserted that Harris' proposed development of the eight acres
"would result in serious damage to [Pease] by interfering with the view
from her property and disturbing her privacy and quiet."
' 12
Harris argued that the restriction against building on the eight-acre
tract should not extend beyond the life of, or twenty-one years after the
death of, the grantee. 122 The court ruled against Harris, and explained that
the restriction against building in the original deed created a servitude in
the nature of an easement for the benefit of the grantee's (Doyle's) re-
tained property (later purchased by Pease).123 The court upheld the prior
deed restriction as intended to be "a perpetual restriction."'' 24
Defendant Pease benefited from the restriction imposed by Doyle.
The eight acres provided her with an "unusually extensive and pictur-
esque view.' 25 This description appears in the court's opinion, and may
indicate that Judge Maltbie had the opportunity to view the property at
issue. 12 6 Additional language in the opinion further reflects the court's
attitudes. The judge notes that the restricted tract was used by Doyle for
farming, and since its sale, "corn, hay and other crops have been raised
on it; and it is particularly adapted for use as an orchard."'' 27 The court
describes the surrounding country as "rural in its characteristics, sparsely
settled, and consist[ing] in the main of woodland and farms."' 8 This
kind of specificity and familiarity with respect to the land in question
may aid a party arguing for the validity and enforceability of a restric-
tion. It certainly appears to have worked in Pease's favor before the rise
in use of conservation easements and other preservation tools.
Foreshadowing major concerns for the conservation easement
movement, the court in Harris stated specifically, "the fact that the
plaintiff's property would be of more value if the restriction were re-
118. See id. at 591.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 590.
121. Id. at 591.
122. See id.
123. See Harris, 66 A.2d. at 591.
124. Id. at 592.
125. Id. at 590.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 590-91.
128. Id. at 591.
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moved is of no consequence."'' 2 9 While holding that the restriction at
issue was not against public policy nor void because it ran in perpetuity,
the court acknowledged potential issues in future cases involving land
restrictions. The court opined:
That does not, of course, mean that there may not be circumstances
which would render such restriction invalid .... Under peculiar cir-
cumstances, it may be so contrary to public policy that the law would
hold it void, as where it is of no benefit to anyone and its enforcement
might seriously interfere with the proper development of the commu-
nity. Changed circumstances, such as use of the defendant's property
for other than residential purposes, might produce a situation where
equity would refuse to enforce even an appurtenant right of this na-
ture.
130
Judge Maltbie implies here that a cost-benefit analysis, depending
upon the circumstances in the future, might justify voiding the restriction
upheld in Harris.'31 Whether a conservation restriction interferes with
community development and whether the doctrine of changed conditions
warrants that a restriction be nullified, asked in the context of a cost-
benefit analysis, are threats to conservation and preservation instruments
no matter how well intended and drafted.
B. Construction and Enforcement Cases
In the same way that intent plays an important role in cases involving
the validity of easements or other restrictions, it also appears as a crucial
factor in conservation enforcement actions focused not on questions of
the validity of the agreement itself, but rather on the meaning and inter-
pretation of provisions in conservation easements.
In Friends of the Shawangunks Incorporated v. Clark, a nonprofit
corporation and four of its members challenged a decision by the Na-
tional Park Service under the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of
1965.132 The federal government provided matching funds to the state of
New York for acquisition of approximately 1400 acres in fee simple and
240 acres as a conservation easement in and around a significant state
park with a large natural lake.' 33 Friends contended that the defendants
did not fulfill their obligations under the Land and Water Conservation
Fund Act, which governed the federal government's funding, when they
decided to allow Marriott Corporation to expand a golf course and re-
lated facilities across the 240 acres subject to the conservation
129. Id. at 592.
130. Harris, 66 A.2d at 592.
131. Id.
132. See Friends v. Clark, 585 F. Supp. 195, 196 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 754 F.2d 446 (2nd
Cir. 1985).
133. See Clark, 585 F. Supp. at 197.
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easement. 34 The United States District Court for the District of New
York framed the question in the case as whether a conversion would oc-
cur. 1 35 The Conservation Fund Act, 16 U.S.C. § 460 1-8(0(3) provides:
"No property acquired or developed with assistance under this section
shall, without the approval of the Secretary [of the Interior], be converted
to other than public outdoor recreation uses."'
136
The district court determined that no conversion would occur be-
cause "public, outdoor, recreation" activities would be increased by Mar-
riott's use of the acreage. 37 The court stated that the public had no right
of access under the conservation easement, and expanded rights of access
once a golf course was constructed on the land.' 3s The court described
the mostly-private golf course as a "bonus to the public."'' 39 The court
explained that because the eased-lands were "not intended for outdoor,
public, recreational use there [could] be no conversion" under the Act. '40
In citing only a general portion of the language in the conservation
easement itself in its decision, the district court downplayed the role of
the document in the controversy. Instead, the court relied upon the lan-
guage of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act and the duties of
the Secretary. 4 Construing the term "conversion," the court opted for a
narrow, exclusive definition of outdoor public recreational use.142 Intent
of the grantor of the conservation easement played no role in the lower
court's decision. The district court referred briefly to language from the
document stating that the easement was acquired "for the purpose of, but
not solely limited to, the conservation and preservation of unique and
scenic areas .... but the court never mentions it again in its opinion.143
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court.' 44 In doing
so, the appellate court cited considerably different provisions of the con-
servation easement and adopted a noteworthy tone. After reciting the
case's procedural history and applicable federal laws, the court com-
menced the substantive part of its ruling with the following passage:
The Shawangunks Range, located in Ulster County, New York, is
noted for spectacular rock formations, sheer cliffs, windswept ledges
with pine barrens, fast-flowing mountain streams and scenic water
134. See id. at 196.
135. See id. at 197.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 200.
138. See id.
139. See Clark, 585 F. Supp. at 200-01.
140. Id. at 200.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 201.
143. Id. at 197.
144. See Clark, 754 F.2d at 452.
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falls, as well as a series of five mountain lakes, the 'Sky Lakes.' Of
these, Lake Minnewaska is one, with extremely steep banks and
many magnificent cliffs rising as high as 150 feet along its northern
and eastern shores. 1
45
The court then noted the surrounding landscape, which consists of
large tracts of open space, and the public use of the surrounding 22,000
acres by hikers and other limited recreational activities. 146 One interpre-
tation of the disparity in the two courts' decision making rests upon the
elemental possibility that the district court cared not one whit for the
landscape at stake whereas the Second Circuit court from the outset of its
opinion expressed great respect and appreciation for the natural beauty of
the area at issue in the suit. This difference in values alone may account
for the different outcome at the appellate level.
The Second Circuit emphasized the purpose of the conservation
easement to conserve and preserve "unique and scenic areas" in its
opening section reciting the law of the case that the conservation ease-
ment provided that the fee owner
shall not develop or erect new facilities within the described area; al-
ter the landscape or terrain; or cut trees but may operate, maintain and
reconstruct existing facilities within the easement area, including, but
not limited to buildings, roads, utilities and golf courses; provided
that (a) Any reconstruction shall be in the same location and utilized
for the same purpose as that which existed on the date hereof and that
such reconstructed facilities shall be no larger in area than the facility
being replaced.
147
The lower court did not cite these provisions.
In its Discussion section, the Second Circuit explained that it inter-
preted public outdoor recreational uses more broadly than the district
court because of the "policies of the Department of Interior and the pur-
poses of the statute" (the Conservation Fund Act).148 The appellate court
interpreted public outdoor recreational uses to encompass uses not in-
volving the public's actual physical presence on the property.149 "After
all," asserted the court, "Webster's Third New International Dictionary
(1971) defines 'recreation' as 'refreshment of the strength and spirits
after toil, . . .'; surely by exposing scenic vistas and serving as a buffer
zone between Minnewaska State Park and developed areas, the easement
area provides such refreshment."
1 50
145. Id. at 447-48.
146. Id. at 448.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 449.
149. Id.
150. Clark, 754 F.2d at 449.
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The court used a manual from the Department of the Interior as
support for its definition of public outdoor recreational uses.' 5' The De-
partment's manual authorizes land acquisition for its scenic or natural
values.152 The court concedes that a surface reading of the Act indicates
that Congress intended primarily active physical recreation. 5 3 However,
the court opines, the Act itself as well as its legislative history reveal
broader intentions. 154
The court then refers to a Senate Report that mentions the need to
improve the "physical and spiritual health and vitality of the American
people. 1 55 In an era of law-making focused on cost-benefit analyses,
takings and individual property rights, a circuit court making references
to spiritual values is remarkable indeed. 156 The tone and import of the
court's opinion, which ascribes values to land that transcend the simple
notion of property as a base commodity, sets the opinion apart from most
legal doctrine. The Second Circuit concluded that the proposed amend-
ment to the conservation easement approved by the Secretary constituted
a conversion. "It is after all," stated the court, "a conservation fund
act." 15
7
In the last section of its opinion, the court expressly recognized the
time and expense invested by Marriott in the project. And the court
confirmed that courts do not control the process of land planning and
development. 59 It noted that undertaking a private project like Marriott's
necessarily involved expenses that presumably would be recouped by
charging the ultimate consumer. 60 Of the cost-benefit argument, the
court responded, "the court's duty remains to follow the law as written
and intended."'
16'
Likewise in Goldmuntz v. Town of Chilmark, the appeals court of
Massachusetts upheld the validity of the restrictions set forth in the con-
servation easement at issue there. 62 In Goldmuntz, the plaintiff applied
for a permit to build an in-ground swimming pool in an area near the
existing dwelling on the property.163 The Chilmark Conservation Com-
mission notified plaintiff that building the pool would violate the conser-




155. Id. at 450.
156. Id.
157. Clark, 754 F.2d at 450.




162. See Goldmuntz v. Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
163. See Goldmunt;, 651 N.E.2d at 865.
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vation easement.164 A land court judge ruled in the plaintiff s declaratory
judgment action that the proposed pool was a structure within the mean-
ing of the easement, and not an improvement of the existing dwelling or
an accessory structure appropriate to certain passive recreational uses.,
65
The court supported its decision defining a pool as a structure by citing
to the town code, which also defined swimming pools as structures for
purposes of zoning set back requirements. 166
The appellate court's analysis begins with the issue of intent. "The
grantor's stated purpose," noted the court, was "to restrict the use of [the
property] and retain it predominantly in its natural, scenic and open con-
dition .. ,,67 It found that the lower court had properly concluded that
the grantor "wanted a tight rein kept on changes to the [plroperty."'
168
The conservation easement controlling the court's decision in
Goldmuntz contains specific and detailed prohibitions. To support its
ruling, the court relied on the provision in the eaFement restricting "[a]ny
surface use of the land, except for agricultural, farming, forest, outdoor
recreational or other purposes consistent with allowing the land and re-
lated areas to remain predominantly in their natural condition.' ' 69 Addi-
tionally, the court could have relied on another restriction in its decision
to reach the same conclusion barring construction of the pool: the prohi-
bition of "[e]xcavation, dredging or removal of loam, peat, gravel, soil,
rock or other mineral substance in such a manner as to affect the sur-
face."'
170
The Massachusetts appellate court's decision is interesting in that it
cites the grantor's intent at some length even though the conservation
easement contains clear language restricting the construction of a swim-
ming pool. A harder question for the court may have been an application
by the plaintiff to build an indoor pool attached to the existing dwelling.
Would that proposal have fallen in the category of "an improvement to
the existing dwelling" or an accessory structure? 7 1 The court noted that
it would allow a bathhouse near the existing swimming pond, for exam-
ple, because it would be an accessory to a passive use of the property.'72
In Clark and Goldmuntz, the courts cited intent and based their





168. Id, at 866.
169. Goldmuntz, 651 N.E.2d at 866.
170. Id. at 867.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 866.
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ments at issue. 73 The court in Rattee v. Commissioner likewise relied on
specific language of the restriction at issue, and the court used that lan-
guage to determine the outcome in the action. 74 In the latter case, Rattee
defended against the claims brought against him by trying to persuade
the court that the agricultural preservation restriction (APR) that applied
to his property contained ambiguous language.175 An APR is a conserva-
tion restriction created by statute based entirely on protecting agricultural
uses of land. 176 In Rattee, the defendant purchased two parcels totaling
185 acres at a foreclosure sale. 177 The former owners had granted the
State of New Hampshire the APR.178 After purchase, Rattee arranged for
the house on a 3.3 acre farmstead site exempt from the APR to be burned
down. 179 He then excavated a field in preparation for construction of a
5,500 square foot home with a 1,500 foot driveway, plans which would
have eliminated two acres of the property from agricultural use. 8° The
State informed Rattee that he was violating the APR shortly after he ap-
plied for a building permit.
188
The court upheld the building restrictions contained in the APR.
182
The APR expressly required Rattee to seek prior approval for construc-
tion from the commissioner for the department of agriculture.'8 3 Rattee
argued that he did not need approval because although the APR con-
tained an express provision mandating it, the state statutes creating the
APR did not contain approval requirements.
84
In ruling in favor of the State, the court cited the state statute at is-
sue:
The stated purpose of RSA chapter 36-D is to 'recognize the impor-
tance of preserving the limited land suitable for agricultural produc-
tion to safeguard the public health and welfare by encouraging the
maximum use of food and fiber producing capabilities of the state's
173. See Clark, 754 F.2d at 449; See Goldmuntz, 651 N.E.2d at 866.
174. See Rattee v. Commissioner, 761 A.2d 1076, 1080 (N.H. 2000).
175. See id.
176. See Rattee, 761 A.2d at 1082; "The statutory purpose of an APR is 'to recognize the
importance of preserving the limited land suitable for agricultural production ... and to ensure the
protection of agricultural land facing conversion to non-agricultural uses." Id. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. RSA Chapter 36-D, (Repealed 1985).
177. See Rattee, 761 A.2d at 1078.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 1079.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 1083.
183. See Rattee, 761 A.2d at 1078.
184. See id. at 1080.
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agriculturally suitable land and to ensure the protection of agricultural
land facing conversion to non-agricultural uses.' 1
85
"Thus," reasoned the court:
[W]hile the APR statute and deed both reserve the right to construct
'dwellings to be used for family living,' requiring prior approval for
such construction is consistent with the statutory purpose. Prior ap-
proval ensures that family dwellings will be constructed in a manner
that minimizes their impact on agricultural production and prevents
potential abuse of the family dwelling exception.
186
In other cases, rather than examining the specific, detailed provi-
sions of the easement or other restriction at issue, courts instead frame
the issues in a particular case in such a way as to shape the outcome of
the action. The importance of the way courts frame issues is evident in
Southbury Land Trust, Inc. v. Andricovich, in much the same way as in
Clark.8 7 In Clark, the lower court emphasized a conventional definition
of 'public outdoor recreational activities' and virtually ignored the lan-
guage of the conservation easement itself. 88 In reversing the lower court,
the Second Circuit relied on the agreement and the intent reflected there
to conserve natural and scenic areas. 89 Similarly in Southbury, the
court's decision depends upon how the court frames the issue. 9 There,
the court found that construction of an additional dwelling unit, separate
from the original residence, was consistent with the drafters' intent to
preserve a working farm. 19 1 The court disregarded express language evi-
dencing the drafters' intent "to retain land or water areas predominantly
in their natural, scenic or open condition or in agricultural, farming, for-
est or open space use."'192 The latter language also appears in the General
Statutes for Connecticut. The opinion states that the conservation ease-
ment at issue was to be a conservation restriction within the meaning of
the statutes.
9 3
In spite of the specific language concerning the retention of land in
its predominantly natural condition, the court ruled that Andricovich
could construct a separate residence for family members on the
property. 94 The court writes: "The plain language of sections 2 (c) and
(b) of the conservation easement clearly allows for the construction of a
detached single-family home . . . . Clearly, the drafters wanted to pre-
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Southbury Land Trust, Inc., 757 A.2d 1263; Clark, 754 F.2d at 449.
188. See Clark, 754 F.2d at 449.
189. See Southbury Land Trust, Inc., 757 A.2d 1263.
190. Id. at 1266.
191. Id. at 1267.
192. Id. at 1264.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 1267.
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serve the pastoral aspects of [the] parcel ... 195 The provisions cited as
clearly allowing construction are as follow:
To restrict Parcel C to its agricultural and open space use, within Par-
cel C land, buildings and other structures shall be used for the fol-
lowing purposes and no other:
(b) A single detached dwelling for one (1) family and not more than
one (1) dwelling per lot, except as provided in subparagraph c below.
(c) An additional dwelling unit for one family in a dwelling or an-
other building, provided that the same is used only as a residence for
one or more members of the family of persons directly employed in
the operation of the uses in subparagraph a above on Parcel C of [the
district] .... 196
The land trust argued that these provisions meant a single family
dwelling attached to or constructed within the existing house or another
existing farm building. 197 The land trust also asserted that the court failed
to consider the conservation easement as a whole in rendering its inter-
pretation of the above-stated provisions. 1
98
To support its decision that the conservation easement clearly pro-
vided for construction of a separate family dwelling, the court cited
Southbury's town code.' 99 As in Goldmuntz, the court turned, not to the
conservation easement itself for a definition consistent with the ease-
ment's intent, but to local ordinances. 200 The code defined dwelling unit
as a building or a part of a building, which the court essentially found
dispositive of the issue as to whether the defendant could construct a
separate building. 20' Finally, the court discussed the drafters' intent, con-
cluding that they could have been more clear in the conservation ease-
ment if they wanted to restrict construction and that restricting ownership
to family members ensured preservation of the pastoral setting.202 Argua-
bly, the court could have decided Southbury either way; the court's
finding of clear language in the conservation easement, and the court's
emphasis on the drafters' intent to preserve a working farm, as opposed
to the drafters' intention to preserve the property in its natural and open
condition, carried the day.
195. Id. at 1266.
196. Southbury Land Trust, Inc., 757 A.2d at 1264.
197. See id. at 1265.
198. See id. at 1266.
199. See id. at 1265.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 1266.
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The court in Redwood Construction Corporation v. Doornbosch
emphasizes not the actual language of the conservation easement at is-
sue, but rather what it lacks. 2°, There, plaintiff Redwood purchased and
204subdivided a parcel. One of its lots lacked public street access, so
Redwood sought to purchase an easement over an access way used by
defendant Doornbosch and other area property owners.20 5 Before transfer
of the easement, Redwood learned that the Doornbosch's property was
subject to a conservation easement.2°6 The easement "prohibited any im-
provements or changes to the Doornbosch property that would affect its
natural, open and scenic nature, or would cause damage to an environ-
mentally-sensitive flood plain. 2°7 It further provided that changes in the
use of the Doornbosch property could not be effected without the written
consent of the West Branch Conservation Association.
The court asserted that: "[h]ere, the restrictive covenants set forth in
West Branch's conservation easement do not expressly address or pro-
hibit the proposed use of the access way at issue.,2 9 Rather, said the
court:
[T]he conservation easement expressly reserved to the grantors the
right to 'sell, give away or otherwise convey the Protected Property
or any portion or portions thereof, provided such conveyance is con-
sistent with and subject to the terms of this Conservation Easement,'
and prohibited only those changes in use of the property 'as would be
detrimental to any significant open space interest, significant natural
habitat interest or other significant conservation interest sought to be
protected by this Conservation Easement.
'210
The court found that West Branch unreasonably withheld its consent
to plaintiffs purchase of the easement. Of note to land trusts and litiga-
tors is the court's finding in the opinion that "Redwood presented an un-
rebutted prima facie case that its de minimis proposed use of the Doom-
bosch property would not be inconsistent with West Branch's conserva-
tion easement., 21' Read: likely, plaintiff hired a credible expert witness
who signed an affidavit that plaintiff submitted with its motion for sum-
mary judgment; defendants probably did not submit an expert opinion to
rebut plaintiffs expert in their response to plaintiffs motion thereby pro-
viding grounds for the court to declare that Redwood had presented "an
unrebutted prima facie case."
203. See Redwood Constr. Corp., 248 A.D.2d at 699.
204. See id at 698.
205. See id. at 698-99.




210. Redwood Constr. Corp., 248 A.D.2d at 699-700.
211. Id. at 700.
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Of particular interest in Redwood is the court's insistence on the
detail lacking in West Branch's easement, e.g. no specific provision bar-
ring plaintiffs easement purchase.21 2 The court seems to imply that ex-
press prohibition would have had to be present in order for the court to
find for the defendants. Significant increased traffic and widening of the
access road appear to outside analysis to be detrimental to both the open
space interest and natural habitat of the property.213
In contrast to Redwood, in Racine v. United States, the Ninth Circuit
expressly noted that the drafter of the "scenic easement" at issue could
214have prohibited the challenged activities specifically in the document.
Racine involved a federal statute that authorized the Secretary of Agri-
culture to acquire "scenic easements" in the Sawtooth National Recrea-
tion Area in Idaho.215 A second-generation landowner with a scenic
easement on his property brought suit to overturn the government's posi-
tion that building structures for dude ranching violated the terms of the
easement.21 6 The easement provided, "[w]ith reference to 36 C.F.R. §
292.16(g)(1), it is agreed that only one residence and one tenant dwelling
are authorized within the easement area., 217 Section 292.16(g)(1) allows
structures that do not "substantially impair or detract" from the scenic,
wildlife and other natural values of the land.218 The section refers to dude
219ranching specifically as permitted activity.
The court affirmed the lower court's interpretation of the restriction
in the scenic easement, saying there was only one way to read the provi-
sion consistently. 220 The court held that the provision meant: "only one
residence and one tenant dwelling will be permitted among the other
dude ranching facilities permitted under . . . [section 292.16(g)( 1 )].,,221
Faced with seemingly contradictory, ambiguous language, the court em-
phasized that "it would have been easy for the Government's drafter to
place language in the deed prohibiting all dude ranching buildings ...
,,222
Although the court ruled for the plaintiff-landowner on the issue of
the construction of dude ranching structures, it upheld the lower cour't
denial of his motion for attorney fees.223 The court opined that the gov-
212. See id. at 699.
213. Id. at 700.
214. See Racine, 858 F.2d at 509.





220. Id. at 508-09
221. Id.
222. Id. at 509.
223. Id.
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ernment's interpretation of the easement was reasonable and that its po-
sition was "substantially justified. 224
C. The Georgetown Cases
A line of three cases, each decided between 1994 and 1997, litigated
by the same organization in one district's lower and appellate courts pro-
vide a unique opportunity to examine a developing series of opinions by
an appellate court dealing with issues concerning conservation and pres-
ervation easements. 25 These three cases involve Deeds of Scenic, Open
Space and Architectural Facade Easements held by the Foundation for
Preservation of Historic Georgetown (the Foundation) and appealed to
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
226
In the three cases, the court notes that in controversies over the cor-
rect interpretation of a contract, ambiguity and the parties' intent play
227key roles. In these cases, where the court determines that the agree-
ment is unambiguous and clear on its face, the court reasons that the
agreement speaks for itself.228 If the court finds that the easement docu-
ment is ambiguous, the court seeks to ascertain the parties' intent by ex-
amining the document in light of the circumstances surrounding its exe-
cution, by examining any agreements or documentary evidence outside
the four corners of the agreement, and, if necessary, by applying tradi-
tional rules of contract construction.229 The court emphasizes in the
Georgetown line of cases, however, that ambiguity in the language of
deeds and contracts is to be construed in accordance with the intent of
the parties insofar as it can be discerned from the language of the instru-
ment itself.
230
Bagley v. Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown
was brought by the Foundation for the Preservation of Historic George-
town against two homeowners (collectively "Bagley") to enforce the
terms of an easement that applied to Bagley's home.23' The easement
prohibited Bagley from building any structure on his property, en-
croaching on any presently open space, or obstructing a view of the
building facade from the street without first obtaining written consent
224. Id.
225. See Bagley v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110 (App. D.C.
1994); Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown v. Arnold, 651 A.2d 794 (App. D.C. 1994);
Sagalyn v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107 (App. D.C. 1997).
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See Bagley, 647 A.2d at 1113.
229. See Arnold, 651 A.2d at 796.
230. See Bagley, 647 A.2d at 1113; See Arnold, 651 A.2d at 796; See Sagalyn, 691 A.2d at
111-12.
231. See Bagley, 647 A.2dat 1111.
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23'from the Foundation. - In late 1989, Bagley began to construct a two-
story addition on the back of his residence to house new air conditioning
233units.
When it learned in December 1989 of the addition Bagley was
building, the Foundation informed Bagley that he had violated the ease-
ment on his property by failing to obtain the Foundation's permission for
234the construction. In addition, argued the Foundation, the construction
itself violated the easement by increasing the footprint of the existing
house.235 Although Bagley acknowledged that he should have requested
permission to make changes to the house, still he asked the Foundation
for a special accommodation allowing him to keep the addition.236 The
Foundation took the position that it would consider alternative design
proposals for the house, but only after Bagley removed the addition.
Bagley refused.238
The Foundation filed a two-count complaint against Bagley in Supe-
rior Court in February 1991 alleging multiple violations of the
easement.2 39 The Foundation sought an injunction to force Bagley to
remove the addition, as well as declaratory and other relief including an
award of attorney fees and costs under the express terms of the
easement.24 Bagley counterclaimed for $1 million in damages and ref-
ormation or rescission of the easement.241 He argued, among other posi-
tions, that the Foundation had selectively and, therefore, unfairly en-
forced its easements.242
The Foundation filed a motion for summary judgment on both of its
claims.243 The trial court denied the motion in part but did order Bagley
to obtain a demolition permit to remove the addition. 244 It also awarded
attorney fees and costs to the Foundation. 45 While the appellate court
stayed the injunction against Bagley, the trial court declined to stay a
hearing on attorney fees and costs. The trial court awarded the Founda-246





236. See id. at 1112.







244. See Bagley, at 1112.
245. See id. at 1113.
246. See id. at 1112-13.
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appeal concerning the restrictive easement violation with his second ap-
peal on the issue of fees and costs.
247
On appeal, Bagley argued that the language of the easement was am-
biguous. 4 The court disagreed, and refused to "create ambiguity where
none exists." It found instead that Bagley's arguments were altogether
unpersuasive.249 The court relied on what it determined to be the unam-
biguous language of the easement, and emphasized that the easement
expressly prohibited the building of additional structures on the property
and any extension of the existing building into open space.250 The court
concluded at the outset of its opinion that, at the very least, the easement
required Bagley to obtain prior written approval from the Foundation
before making any changes to his home's facade or its surrounding open
251space.
One of the many arguments posited by Bagley during the course of
the litigation concerned a previous easement that he had donated to the
Foundation.252 In that easement, explained Bagley, only the front of the
house and property were subject to restrictions.253 Therefore, he argued,
he legitimately believed that the second easement was only pertinent to
the front of his house and property. 254 This argument is of some interest
here because in Arnold, discussed infra, the easement the landowner
granted to the Foundation contained restrictions that did apply only to the
front of the house.255 The easement in Arnold had been granted in 1980,
the easement in Bagley in 1988.256 The issues and outcomes in Arnold
and Bagley may reflect evolution in terms of easement drafting on the
part of the Foundation.
To decide Bagley, the appellate court relied upon the actual language
257of the easement at issue. The court's holding hinged, in part, on Sec-
tion 4(f) of the easement, which provided that the Foundation will "exer-
cise reasonable judgment and care in performing its obligations and ex-
ercising its rights under the terms of this easement." 258 In response to
Bagley's contention that it was unreasonable for the Foundation to de-
mand that he demolish his addition before any negotiations could take
place, the court noted that the Foundation could have entered the prop-




251. See Bagley, 647 A.2d at 1113.
252. See id. at 1112, n.2.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See Arnold. 651 A.2d at 795-96.
256. See id. at 795; See Bagley, 647 A.2d at I I 11.
257. See Bagley, 647 A.2d at 1113.
258. Id.
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erty and removed the addition itself.259 The fact that the Foundation re-
frained from exercising its harshest remedy for Bagley's violation
seemed to influence the court's ruling positively.
In addition to affirming the lower court's ruling on Bagley's viola-
tion of the easement at issue, the appellate court upheld the trial judge's
award of attorney fees and costs, citing specific language from Section
10(d) of the easement, which provided that: "[i]n the event [Bagley is]
found to have violated any of [his] obligations, [he] shall reimburse [the
Foundation] for any costs or expenses incurred in connection therewith,
including court costs and attorneys' fees. 26° In a sharp reprimand of
Bagley's scattershot tactics, the court stated, "Bagley cannot litigate te-
naciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent
by plaintiff in response. 26' It continued unapologetically by stating:
In the present case, a clear violation of the easement agreement was
brought to Bagley's attention at an early date. It was or should have
been readily apparent that Bagley had no viable defense. Instead of
coming promptly into compliance, Bagley interposed various de-
fenses and counterclaims, some of which (e.g. his 'due process'
claims, his 'selective enforcement' theory, and his demands for 'ref-
ormation' and 'rescission') were, in our view, patently frivolous.
Approximately two-thirds of the Foundation's billable hours were
addressed to discovery and litigation regardin 6Bagley's altogether
implausible defense theories and counterclaims.
Although the trial court reduced the Foundation's fee award for
some of the hours billed by the associate attorney on the case, both the
trial and appellate courts authorized payment of attorney fees for the two
Foundation attorneys.
263
The court in Bagley found that the language of the easement was
unambiguous on its face. The court's strict adherence to the language of
the easement in Bagley is notable because the court does not rely on, or
abuse, the opportunity for interpretation of the parties' intent to reach a
particular decision. Of note to land trusts is the fact that even though
Bagley tried to strong-arm the Foundation by bringing myriad scattershot
claims and seeking one million dollars in damages, the court found Ba-
gley's claims, indeed his efforts to intimidate, "altogether
implausible. ' 26
259. See id.
260. Id. at 1115.
261. Id. at 1114-15.
262. Id. at 1115.
263. See Bagley, 647 A.2d at 1115.
264. Id. at 1113, 1115.
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In a decision that followed closely on the heels of Bagley, the Foun-
dation appealed from a trial court's order granting summary judgment in
an action it brought for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce an
easement granted by Arnold's predecessor in Foundation for the Preser-
vation of Historic Georgetown v. Arnold.265 The Foundation argued that
Arnold violated the terms of his easement by laterally enclosing a space
between two dormer windows on the roof of the dwelling and by build-
266ing a seasonal awning across the patio at the rear of the house.
The court examined two clauses of the easement. The first prohib-
ited Arnold from undertaking any "construction, alteration, or remodel-
ing ... which would affect the exterior surfaces herein described, or in-
crease the height, or alter the exterior faqade ... or the appearance of the
building .... 267 Section 1 of the easement defined "[t]he exterior sur-
face of improvements.., on the subject premises as those depicted in the
photographs attached ... to the easement and those improvements visible
from the front of the house., 268 Because the photos of Arnold's house
taken at the time of the donation of the easement, and the language of the
easement itself, referred to the front of the house only, the Foundation
was forced to agree that Section 1 did not prohibit Arnold's changes to
269the premises.
The Foundation turned instead to a general, less-forceful second
clause, which provided that "[n]o extension of the existing structure or
erection of additional structures shall be permitted," and argued that the
enclosure between the windows and the patio awning extended the house
in terms of interior density in a way that violated the easement. 270 The
Foundation's argument depended upon interpretation of the meaning of
the word extension. If the court found that the term extension was am-
biguous, asserted the Foundation, then the court could look to the ap-
praisal that was prepared contemporaneously with the easement as an
indication that the parties intended to prohibit increased density in the
building's interior.
The court scrutinized the language of the document and began its
inquiry with a determination that the term extension was ambiguous.272
The court iterated that because the term was not defined in the easement,
265. See Arnold, 651 A.2d at 795.
266. See id.
267. Id. at 796.
268. Id.
269. See id. Land conservation organizations can take away one important lesson from Arnold:
photograph the entire site to be protected, e.g. the house, ranch, wetland et al.. Armed with
photographs of the back of Arnold's house, the Foundation probably would have prevailed in the
action.
270. Id.
271. Arnold, 651 A.2d at 795.
272. Id.
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it could mean many things, and it could find no other language in the
easement to eliminate the ambiguity of word.2 73
Because the court found the term extension to be ambiguous, it
opened the door for consideration of extrinsic evidence as an indication
of the parties' intent.2 74 The Foundation argued that the contemporane-
ously-prepared appraisal evidenced the meaning of extension.275 The
court disagreed, finding that the appraisal did not evidence what both
parties intended at the granting of the easement because it was prepared
solely by and for the grantor of the easement.
271
In rejecting extrinsic evidence, the court turned to traditional rules
of construction, which are common law rules governing contract inter-
pretation.277 The court cited the well-recognized rule that restrictions on
land use are to be construed in favor of the free use of land and against
278the party who drafted the document. The Foundation argued that this
common law rule should apply only to restrictive covenants, and not to
statutorily-created conservation and preservation easements. 279 The court
dismissed this argument as vague and unconvincing. 280 Because the
Foundation lost on its only argument for the appraisal as extrinsic evi-
dence, it was hamstrung by common law rules of construction having
nothing to do with the intent of the parties.
An important doctrinal question raised by Arnold is whether tradi-
tional common law rules of construction related to real property restric-
tions should even apply in cases involving conservation easements or
restrictions. In any such easement, the intent of the parties is expressed as
preservation or conservation. Why, then, do courts like the District of
Columbia apply rules of construction that contradict the goals of the par-
ties and the entire justification for a grantor's tax break? Arguably, the
well-recognized rule of construction that "restrictions on land use should
be construed in favor of the free use of land and against the party seeking
enforcement" has no business being recognized at all by courts deter-
mining enforcement and defense disputes concerning conservation ease-
ments.
2 81
One court among the published opinions that we reviewed recog-
nized this issue.282 In Bennett v. Comm'r of Food and Agriculture, the
273. See id. at 796-97.
274. See id.
275. Id. at 797.
276. See id.
277. Id.




282. See Bennett, 576 N.E.2d 1365.
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Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the plain meaning of an agricul-
tural preservation restriction (APR) that conferred approval authority on
the Commissioner with respect to the location of dwellings on the prop-
erty subject to the APR.283
Bennett sought to build a large, hilltop house on his 250 acre farm,
which was subject to an APR granted by Bennett's predecessor-in-
interest.284 The Commissioner of Food and Agriculture determined that
the location would cause erosion as well as the loss of about two acres of
farmland, and he offered Bennett five other possible building sites.285
Bennett filed suit and argued that the provision conferring authority on
the Commissioner was unenforceable under common law rules requiring
privity of estate or contract in order for a party to enforce a servitude.
The court responded to Bennett's argument by asserting that:
[W]here the beneficiary of the restriction is the public and the restric-
tion reinforces a legislatively stated public purpose, old common law
rules barring the creation and enforcement of easements in gross have
no continuing force. In such a case, the appropriate question is
whether the bargain contravened public policy when it was made and
whether its enforcement is consistent with public policy and is rea-
sonable.
287
In a footnote, the court explained further:
What we decide here does not, of course, endorse the enforcement of
all easements in gross. It does, however, prompt us to observe that
certain common law rules concerning the creation, validity, and en-
forcement of servitudes may no longer be sound and that we are
willing to reconsider them in appropriate cases.
288
In cases involving the enforcement and defense of conservation
easements and other restrictive servitudes, courts should follow the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court's lead, especially when considering the rele-
vance of traditional common law rules regarding the free use of land as
well as those rules requiring that real property limitations be construed
restrictively and against their drafters.
In keeping with its examination in Arnold, the court in Sagalyn v.
Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown also relied on
rules of construction to reach its decision. 289 The court began its inquiry
283. See id. at 1366, 1368.
284. See id. at 1365.
285. See id. at 1365-66.
286. See id. at 1365.
287. Id. at 1367.
288. Id. at 1368, n.4.
289. See Sagalyn, 691 A.2d 107.
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by focusing on the language of the easement and whether it was ambigu-
ous.
290
In Sagalyn, second generation homeowners challenged the conser-
vation and preservation easement encumbering their Georgetown prop-
erty, which property was comprised of several different residential
lots.2 9 1 The easement imposed several restrictions on the alteration, use,
division, and conveyance of the property, including a prohibition against
subdivision or conveyance of the property, except as a unit.2 92 It also
provided that in the event of violation of its covenants or restrictions, the
grantee could institute a suit for injunctive relief and recover costs and
attorney fees if it prevailed.293
When the Sagalyns purchased their property a conservation and
preservation easement already encumbered it. S4 Before they purchased
the property, the Sagalyns requested, and the Foundation granted, per-
mission to construct a swimming pool. 2 95 After they purchased the prop-
erty, the Sagalyns sought another waiver of the easement to construct a
one-story addition to their kitchen, which the Foundation denied. 96
Without the Foundation's knowledge, the Sagalyns applied for and
obtained a zoning change, which consisted of a new record lot designa-
tion for the property from multiple lots to a single lot of record, as a pre-
liminary step towards securing a building permit for the kitchen addition
297they desired. Even though the Foundation spoke in opposition to issu-
ance of the permit at a hearing before the Commission of Fine Arts, the
Commission issued the permit to the Sagalyns anyway, without making
any findings related to the easement.298
The parties attempted to settle the dispute over the kitchen addition
on several different occasions without success. 299 At one point, the Foun-
dation offered to let the Sagalyns replace their existing kitchen wall with
a glass wall if they would also agree to pay the Foundation's attorney
fees and costs to date, which amounted to about $1 1,000.00. 30 The Sa-
galyns refused. 301 To protect its rights with respect to a timely challenge
of the issuance of the building permit, the Foundation filed a complaint
290. See id., at 111.
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for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the easement. 3°2 The trial
court enjoined the Sagalyns from constructing any addition without the
Foundation's approval and referred the Foundation's request for attor-
neys' fees and costs to a mediator.30 3 After mediation failed, the trial
court entered final summary judgment in favor of the Foundation, con-
cluding that the Sagalyns had violated the easement by having their mul-
tiple lots re-designated as a single lot.
304
At issue on appeal was the meaning of subdivide as used in the ser-
vitude, which read: "[t]he property shall not be subdivided, nor shall it
ever be devised or conveyed except as a unit." 30 5 The Sagalyns argued
that the term should be given its plain, ordinary, and usual interpretation
in accordance with Webster's Third New International Dictionary and
Black's Law Dictionary, which define subdivide as to divide into smaller
parts and subdivision as the division of a lot, tract, or parcel of land into
two or more lots, tracts, or parcels for sale or development. 3°6 The Foun-
dation contended that "subdivide" is a term of art without any plain or
307ordinary meaning.
Based upon the Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection
Act and local regulations, the court determined that "subdivide" could be
interpreted in a number of different ways.308 Both the Act and local
regulations defined "subdivide" to mean both the division of land and the
assembly of it. 309 Once the court determined that "subdivide" could mean
two different things, the court turned to rules of construction. 3 1° The
court cited the objective law of contracts, which states that the written
language of an agreement will govern the parties' rights unless its
meaning is unclear.311 "[T]he first step in contract interpretation," as-
serted the court, "is determining what a reasonable person in the position
of the parties would have thought the disputed language meant.
' 3
It is hard to imagine any reasonable person defining subdivision as
anything other than a division of property into two or more smaller par-
cels. Leave it to the masters of legal wrangling, including both legislators
and lawyers, to come up with an assemblage version of the word subdi-
vide. Notwithstanding the counter-intuitive meaning of subdivide in the
302. See id.
303. See Sagalyn, 691 A.2d at 109.
304. See id. at 111.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 111-12.
308. See id. at 112.
309. See id.
310. See id. at 112.
311. Seeid. at Ill.
312. Id.
2001]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
District of Columbia as well as the court's previous ruling in Acheson,3 13
the Sagalyn court held that the homeowners violated the subdivision pro-
hibition of the conservation easement by obtaining a zoning change that
assembled their multiple lots into two.
3 1
Having agreed with the Foundation's interpretation of the word
subdivide, the court partially upheld the lower court's $33,994.65 award
of attorney fees and costs under the express provisions of the
easement.3 15 The Sagalyns argued that the Foundation was not entitled to
fees and costs related to its claim for injunctive relief because the Sa-
galyns had agreed not to start construction of the addition until the dis-
pute was resolved.31 6 The appellate court agreed with the homeowners
and ruled that the Foundation's injunctive relief claim was premature.
317
The court remanded the attorney fees and costs issue to the district court
for a determination of the proper amount of the award, which would be
reduced by amount of the fees and costs related to the injunctive relief
claim only.
The Georgetown cases provide the only opportunity to date to ex-
amine one court's approach to analyzing conservation and preservation
easements over time in the context of defense and enforcement actions.
We learn that if a court cannot readily assess the meaning of the docu-
ment and the parties' intent, as it could not in Arnold, then a court may
turn to traditional common law rules. Because common law principles of
property as well as contract construction and interpretation are not con-
sistent with the goals of conservation statutes, decisions wherein courts
rely on common law rules, are most often at odds with the original con-
servation purpose of an easement and the intent of the parties. Land
trusts enforcing and defending easements should provide evidence of the
plain meaning of the easement by pointing to clear, unequivocal, uncon-
tradicted language in the document itself (which, of course, requires that
such language be drafted clearly), and, if necessary, by bolstering the
document's meaning with extrinsic evidence of the drafters' intent, such
as with an appraisal or baseline. Once a court has determined that it can-
not devise the meaning of a document or the intent of its drafters from
the conservation easement or other restrictive document itself, then a
court may evaluate the document in terms of common law real property
and contract doctrine, where, as we have seen, anything goes.
313. Acheson, 520 A.2d 318.
314. Sagalyn, 691 A.2d at 115.
315. See id. at 114, 115.
316. See id. at 114-15.
317. See id.
318. Seeid. at 115.
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IV. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FOR LAND TRUSTS
Considering what we have reviewed and looking ahead, land trusts
can and should anticipate confronting most or all of the issues raised to
date in cases involving conservation easement enforcement and defense.
Legal opinions to date spotlight themes that will arise in future litigation:
third-party standing; the role of carefully drafted purpose and intent
statements in trust documents and conservation documents alike; tradi-
tional common law rules involving real property rights and contract con-
struction and interpretation; the merger and changed conditions doc-
trines; and how cost-benefit analyses may influence judicial decision-
making.
In light of the outcomes so far in enforcement and defense cases,
conservation and preservation organizations with sound drafting prac-
tices and solid documents should feel confident. However, several strate-
gies are worth considering. For example, can land trusts draft conserva-
tion documents designed to contract around some of the issues that have
arisen in litigation? Such qualifying language as "This conservation
easement shall not be subject to extinguishment by the doctrines of
merger or changed conditions" may provide ammunition in a challenge.
Inserting a provision such as "Any question as to the validity or inter-
pretation of this conservation easement shall not be determined on the
basis of cost-benefit analysis" may force a court to limit its considera-
tions in a particular enforcement or defense action in a way favorable to
land trusts.
Many creative drafting possibilities exist for anticipating future
challenges, at least in terms of traditional legal doctrine and court opin-
ions to date. In addition to the suggestions described above, land trusts
should contemplate and implement the following, as appropriate:
0 Drafting of thorough and consistent conservation documents.
We see this principal play out in most of the cases that we analyzed
because in a civil action courts look first and foremost to the language
within the four corners of a conservation document. The more thorough
and consistent the document, the better the chance a court will uphold its
restrictions. Drafting for ambiguity, or amending a conservation docu-
ment to resolve an enforcement issue, weakens a land trust's ability to
enforce restrictions and uphold the conservation values of its easements.
Particularly with regard to drafting for ambiguity, dangers arise for land
trusts because courts to date have turned to common law rules of prop-
erty and contract to interpret conservation documents. Where ambiguity
exists in conservation documents, courts may apply common law rules
319that further compromise a conservation document's purpose.
319. See discussion supra Section I1l(C) for case law on this point.
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* Inclusion of clear and unambiguous statements of intent and
purpose.
In cases involving conservation documents that courts determine are
ambiguous, the courts turn to the question of the parties' intent in exe-
cuting the agreement at issue. Section HI of this paper addresses the role
of intent and the cases in that section demonstrate how important state-
ments of intent and purpose can be in conservation documents.
* Make deliberate choices with respect to picking battles; e.g. are
the permitted and prohibited uses in the conservation document
tied directly to the document's purpose section.
As evidenced by the cases that we examined in this paper, the
strength of conservation documents and the attitudes of a tribunal are
important considerations for a land trust evaluating its position for pur-
poses of litigation. If a court chooses to look beyond the restrictive lan-
guage in a document, or finds that language ambiguous, a clear and con-
sistent statement of purpose tied to the prohibition a land trust seeks to
enforce is extremely useful.
* Anticipate issues that may arise as a result of changed condi-
tions and draft documents accordingly.
The court in Harris v. Pease,320 stated that changed conditions in the
future could give rise to circumstances justifying elimination of the land
use restrictions at issue in the case. If the purpose of a conservation
easement is narrow, for example to preserve a crane rookery, a particular
endangered species of plant, or a wetlands area, it is important for land
trusts to try to think ahead 100 years or more to a changed landscape.
Will the purpose of the conservation easement still exist, or will the re-
strictions be voided by elimination of the purpose of the original ease-
ment? Is the goal long term preservation of the land or just the specific
ecological feature of the property? Although narrow purpose statements
in conservation documents aid land trusts' stewardship efforts and assist
in litigation when the particular purpose is at risk from landowner activ-
ity, a long view of the conservation effort is important and conservation
easements should contain language barring extinguishment by changed
conditions.
* In litigation, know your tribunal and provide detailed and scenic
visual images of the property at issue; before a receptive tribu-
nal, present the multidimensional nature of land and our inter-
action with it, e.g. the ecological, wildlife, historical and spiri-
tual aspects of a particular landscape; photo documentation can
be invaluable for resolving disputes.
320. See discussion supra Section 111(A).
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EXAMINATION OF COURT OPINIONS
The Friends of the Shawangunks and Bagley cases, illustrate these
principles best. The maxim "a picture is worth a thousand words" applies
with double force to land use issues generally, and especially when the
integrity of a natural landscape is at issue as it so often is in conservation
easement enforcement and defense cases.
0 Be prepared in litigation to confront the possibility that a court
may apply a cost-benefit analysis to the issues.
The starkest example of this threat in the cases we examined is in
Gallaway.321 Also, the court in Harris references this issue specifically.
Land trusts should anticipate the cost-benefit issue in drafting their
documents, as suggested above, and, when relevant in litigation, be pre-
pared to present a court with their own economic analyses of the benefits
of conserving land. Courts may or may not uphold the waiver of the cost-
benefit defense (which is the intended effect of the proposed language
stated above), but even so such provisions are worth including in conser-
vation documents.
* When it is appropriate and useful, do not hesitate to formally
mediate disputes and to seek legal remedies and attorney fees
and costs.
As we have seen in the cases discussed in this paper, courts gener-
ally uphold conservation documents. And courts will award substantial
attorney fees and costs, as in Bagley. Land trusts should feel confident as
a result of our findings, and be willing to consider litigation issues now
as a preventive measure, as well as to continue to improve their conser-
vation documents.
CONCLUSION
Based upon our examination of the case law to date, land trusts
should be aware that courts are considering common law doctrines and
economic factors in their examination of conservation documents. While
courts are examining the intent of the parties, they also reject evidence of
the parties' intent and devise their own interpretations of documents.
Land trusts should prepare for defense and enforcement actions by for-
mulating responses in these areas with the knowledge that a court may
not rely upon the land trust's testimony as to intent or the facts of a
situation, but may look elsewhere for guidance in decision-making.
In the evolving area of law on conservation easement defense and
enforcement, land trusts can look forward to court opinions that clarify
and illuminate the issues addressed so far in litigation. Land trusts should
also cast a wary eye toward our courts for opinions that may not comport
with the values and goals of the land trust conservation movement and
321. See discussion supra Section 1I(A).
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the sincere intentions of landowners to preserve the natural, scenic and
wildlife values on their property. Many challenges lie ahead, like for
example establishing the rights of standing for third-parties in all juris-
dictions to bring citizen actions to enforce conservation easements. Land
trusts and their legal counsel are definitely up to the task.
